Introduction
In today's globally interconnected financial system, the effects of a central bank's actions reach far beyond national borders. Monetary policy, in particular, can affect local and international financial markets in numerous ways: via interest rates, asset prices, and the availability of credit. These monetary effects can then feed into the real side of the economy.
While the impact of monetary policy on the supply of credit in the domestic economy has been widely analyzed (Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Kashyap and Stein (2000) , Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2012)), recent attention has turned to the impact of monetary policy on the supply of credit to borrowers located abroad. The rise of global banks, i.e., banks which lend to borrowers cross-border or maintain foreign affiliates in many other countries, over the past two decades has added a sense of urgency to the study of potential "global" bank lending channels.
1 Following monetary easing at home, global banks can both increase cross-border flows to other countries via the external capital market and send funds to their foreign affiliates via the internal capital market.
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As in Kashyap and Stein (2000) , our identification strategy is based on the hypothesis that − due to the resultant differential funding constraints -less liquid or capitalized global banks exhibit a stronger response to changes in monetary conditions at home than their more liquid or better capitalized counterparts.
We find strong evidence that U.S. monetary easing (tightening), as measured by changes in the Federal funds rate, is associated with meaningful increases (decreases) in the bilateral cross-border flows of U.S.
banks in the pre-crisis period. This effect is substantially stronger for both less-liquid and for lesscapitalized banks. We also find some evidence that unconventional monetary policy (quantitative easing)
in the post-crisis period, as measured by increases in the Fed's purchases of Treasury securities, significantly increases bilateral cross-border flows by U.S. banks. These results are also present when studying maturity or target sector-specific credit flows. Finally, we show that the increases and decreases in these cross-border flows in response to changes in U.S. monetary policy are largest in the lower income countries. Our results also suggest that while U.S. banks' foreign affiliate flows are significantly affected by the bank lending channel of host country monetary policy in the pre-crisis period, the stance of U.S. monetary policy has no significant impact on these affiliate flows. In some auxiliary estimations we find that U.S monetary easing also contributes to U.S. banks' decision to enter new host markets in the pre-crisis period.
Our main contributions to this literature are as follows. First, our results show the significant impact of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. banks' cross-border flows via external capital markets, i.e., to non-affiliated parties abroad. These results complement previous results on the existence of the bank lending channel in U.S. banks' internal capital markets abroad (Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) ) and U.S. banks' foreign affiliate lending abroad (Morais, Peydró and Ruiz (2015) , Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) ).
4 Second, our bilateral financial flows data at the bank-host country-maturity and bank-host countrysector level allows us to directly control for changes in conditions that are likely to affect the demand for investment by U.S. banks abroad. Since our goal is to identify U.S. monetary policy effects on the supply of bank credit to foreign countries, our use of a broad set of fixed effects to control for demand-side changes allows for a clearer identification of the bank lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler (1995) ).
Third, our data extends to the first quarter of 2013, providing us with a substantially longer time horizon to examine the impact of U.S. quantitative easing on the international bank lending channel than previous work. Comparing the pre-vs. post-crisis periods using a difference-in-difference approach, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) for example document a more severe lending contraction over time by liquidity-constrained banks. Morais, Peydró and Ruiz (2015) show the expansionary effect of U.S.
quantitative easing on the lending of U.S. banks through foreign affiliates. We study the impact of quantitative easing on cross-border flows while carefully controlling for changes in time-varying demandside conditions throughout and in the aftermath of the financial crisis. We find some evidence of a postcrisis bank lending channel, i.e., that quantitative easing (measured by decreases in the U.S. shadow short-term rate and the Fed's sale of U.S. Treasury securities) increases the bilateral cross-border flows of funding-constrained U.S. banks significantly more than their unconstrained counterparts after the onset of the crisis.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical methodology in detail, and presents the model specifications. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 presents the results of the estimation. Section 5 examines the period after the onset of the financial crisis when the Federal
Reserve heavily relied on non-traditional monetary instruments. Section 6 offers some concluding thoughts.
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Empirical Methodology
Our main specification describes U.S. banks' quarterly cross-border flows as follows. Let , , denote bank j's holdings of cross-border claims in host country i's at time t. The superscript n denotes either target sector (private non-financial, public or financial) or maturity of the claim, depending on the breakdown of the data for a specific estimation. Then ln , , captures the quarterly change (from time t-1 to time t) of the natural logarithm of the cross-border bank flow of maturity or sector n of bank j into host country i. Our specification is as follows:
(1) ln , ,
In Equation (1), ln , , denotes the quarter-to-quarter cross-border flow at the bank-country level as described above. The monetary policy variable MP is the quarterly change in the Federal ("Fed") funds rate from time t-1 to t. Furthermore, C denotes the bank's liquidity ratio defined as the deposit to assets ratio, later replaced by the capital to assets ratio. As in Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) , we focus on the cumulative impact of monetary policy changes over the four preceding quarters. 5 Therefore, four lags of the monetary shock measure, the liquidity measure, and their interactions are included. 6 For the maturity-specific specifications, n characterizes remaining maturity:
Short-term (less than 1 year) or long term (over 1 year). For the target sector-specific specifications, n characterizes: Financial sector, non-financial private sector or public sector. Bank Controls contains a 5 The inclusion of four lags of the quarterly interest rate changes ensures that we capture the cumulative effect of monetary policy shocks throughout the previous year. While the use of four lags has become standard in the literature, we also repeat the analysis using three and five lags of the monetary policy shocks, and find that our results are robust to changes in the number of lags used.
6 vector of supply-side variables: Lagged values of bank total assets, capital-asset ratio, return on equity and the ratio of interest plus non-interest expenses to total assets. Lastly, Demand Controls contains various combinations of bank, host country, time and sector or maturity fixed effects to control for changes in demand-side conditions. In addition, Demand Controls contains a Selection Correction term to control for the sample selection bias due to the fact that the dependent variable ln is observed for only a select group of globally active U.S. banks.
We also examine financial flows of foreign affiliates, i.e., these also can be considered "local" bank flows because the affiliate has a local presence in the foreign country. Let , denote bank j's holdings of local claims in host country i at time t. Then ln , captures the quarterly (from time t-1 to time t) bank flows of bank j's foreign affiliate in host country i. Equation (2) describes our empirical specification.
In addition to the variables described for Equation (1) above, Equation (2) also contains the host country i monetary policy measure and its interaction with the liquidity ratio , . 7 This monetary measure is defined as the quarterly change in the host country i short-term base interest rate (the local equivalent of the Fed funds rate). The vector Demand Controls contains various combinations of bank, host country and time fixed effects, as well as host country macro controls in some specifications. 8 Demand Controls also contains a Selection Correction term to control for the sample selection bias due to the fact that the 7 The inclusion of four lags of both the U.S. and host country monetary policy shocks ensures that the cumulative effects of the monetary policy shocks of both countries are captured, even if the timing of the transmission of the U.S. and host country monetary policy effects may differ to some extent. 8 The inclusion of bank fixed effects also controls for time-invariant bank traits (such as a bank's ownership structure or business model) that may impact global lending flows. The inclusion of time fixed effects controls for cyclicality and seasonality. dependent variable ln is observed for only those U.S. banks who actively maintain an affiliate in host country i.
In both Equations (1) and (2) banks which are quite 'specialized', with 3 or fewer affiliate-active countries. As will become clear below,
we demonstrate that our results are robust to removing the "specialized" banks from our sample.
3.b. Data on U.S. banks' balance sheet and financial conditions
Our bank-level (supply-side) control variables come from the quarterly balance sheet and financial database collected from the Report of Condition and Income (Call Reports). 13 We include the following bank-specific variables in our regressions: total assets, capital to asset ratio, deposit to asset ratio, return on equity and the expense ratio. In order to control for reporting biases, we also calculate a Selection 
3.c. Data on U.S. and host country monetary and macro characteristics
In some specifications of our estimation of local (affiliate) bank flows and foreign affiliate presence, we also include a set of host country macroeconomic characteristics to control for time-variant changes in demand conditions. We focus on the following set of controls: Quarterly change in the host country's short-term interest rate, the exchange rate and the host country's GDP. Table 1 provides detailed data descriptions, sources, and summary statistics.
Estimation Results
We present our estimation results in Tables 2 through 7 . In Table 2 , we estimate Equation (1) using the maturity-specific cross-border bank flows dataset, identifying the role of U.S. monetary policy shocks using the deposit to assets ratio as the bank liquidity measure. We then repeat the same exercise, using the capital to asset ratio as our funding constraint measure in Table 3 . We then move on to examine the bank lending channel using the sector-specific version of our cross-border bank flows dataset in Table 4 using both the deposit to asset and capital ratios as measures of bank funding constraints. While in 12   Tables 2 through 4 we focus our attention on the pre-crisis period, in Table 5 we examine the role of the Fed's unconventional monetary policy actions after the onset of the crisis in determining U.S. banks' cross-border flows. In Table 6 , we explore how the impact of U.S. monetary policy differs between the higher and lower income host countries in our sample. Lastly, in Table 7 we study the role of U.S. and host country monetary policy shocks in driving U.S. banks' local (affiliate) flows in foreign countries. Table 2 shows that there is strong evidence of a global bank lending channel in U.S. banks' cross-border changes in exposures in the 2003-2007 period. As we move from Column 1 to 4, we include an increasingly exhaustive set of fixed effects to control for non-monetary shocks and unobservable factors.
Cross-Border Flows
The results in Table 2 indicate that an impact of a 100 basis points decrease in the U.S. Fed funds rate causes a cumulative 6.12 to 7.66 percentage points increase in bilateral cross-border flows.
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Importantly, the coefficients on the interaction of the U.S. Fed funds rate change and the bank's liquidity (deposit to asset) ratio is highly significant throughout. Therefore, the bilateral cross-border flows of more liquidity-constrained U.S. banks are affected by U.S. monetary policy significantly more than the flows of their liquidity-abundant counterparts, suggesting a causal role for U.S. monetary policy. In fact, the percentage change in U.S. cross-border lending across countries and credit maturities following a 100 basis points decrease in the U.S. Fed funds rate is 3.08 to 5.18 percentage points higher for illiquid banks (at the 25 th percentile of liquidity distribution) than liquid banks (at the 75 th percentile of liquidity).
16 15 A 100 basis points change in the Fed Funds rate corresponds to an approximately two standard deviation change. While the Fed generally changes interest rates in 25 basis points increments, a particular monetary policy goal (tightening or easing) is generally achieved in several steps. Since we are examining the cumulative effects of monetary policy actions over four quarters, we present results in response to a 100 bps change in the interest rate. The mean change in cross-border flows during the pre-crisis period equals 2.76 percent, with a standard deviation of 42.98. 16 Cross-border lending flows are generated out of the funds of banks' domestic (US) offices, which are exposed to US monetary policy-induced funding shocks. Therefore, host country interest rate changes are not included in the As mentioned above, about 25 percent of observations in the sample come from U.S. banks that are specialized lenders, i.e., make cross-border investments in 4 or fewer countries. The inclusion of these banks in the sample may bias our results, since the bilateral cross-border flows of these specialized banks may be strongly affected by historical, cultural or ownership ties (Paravisini, Rappoport and Schnabl (2014)). Therefore, in Columns 5 through 9 we focus our attention on multi-country lenders, i.e., banks with 5 or more bilateral cross-border relationships. We find that the coefficient on the interaction of bank liquidity and U.S. monetary shocks remains highly significant, even with the inclusion of increasingly exhaustive sets of fixed effects. Liquidity-constrained U.S. banks increase their bilateral cross-border flows by 2.79 to 4.76 percentage points more than their liquidity-abundant counterparts in response to a 100 basis points decrease in the Fed funds rate.
In Columns 10 and 11, we examine how our results on the presence on an active international bank lending channel may vary depending on the maturity of cross-border flows. We expect that quarterly monetary policy shocks have a stronger impact on short-term claims than long-term flows, as the former are easier to adjust depending on liquidity conditions. Indeed, the coefficient on the liquidity and monetary shock interaction is significant at the 5 percent level in short-term flows. Furthermore, liquidity-constrained banks' short-term cross-border flows respond 5.33 percentage points more to a 100 basis points decrease in the Fed funds rate than the flows of their liquidity-abundant counterparts.
In auxiliary regressions, we also explore how monetary policy affects the maturity composition of crossborder lending, 17 and find that monetary tightening in the US causes a significant shift towards shortterm maturities in US banks' cross-border flows. Furthermore, this monetary policy-induced shift towards short-term flows is significantly greater for liquidity-constrained US banks. The result that cross-border specifications. The choice to do so is validated by the finding that our US monetary transmission results are robust to the inclusion of Host Country -Time Fixed Effects (which would pick up any impact that host country interest rate changes may have on cross-border lending flows). When we repeat Models 4 and 9 of Table 2 including host country interest rate changes in a robustness check, we find that these variables enter the regressions insignificantly while the US monetary policy effects remain significant. 17 Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
funding-constrained banks add more cross-border claims, 18 all else equal, apparent through Table 2 , is consistent with the findings of Temesvary (2014).
In Table 3 , we repeat the same specifications as in Table 2 using the capital ratio as our measure of a bank's ability to obtain outside funding. These results also show convincing evidence of an international bank lending channel in cross-border flows. Throughout the table, the monetary policy effects are greater in magnitude than those we obtained using the deposit to asset ratio as the funding constraint measure. While the full-sample specifications in Columns 1 through 4 exhibit weaker results, the monetary policy coefficients become highly significant when we control for the confounding effects of specialized lender banks in Columns 5 through 9. These results indicate that a 100 basis points decrease in the U.S. Fed funds rate leads to a 9.72 to 19.64 percentage points increase in bilateral cross-border lending flows, and this impact is significantly higher for less-capitalized U.S. banks. Depending on the specification, a 100 basis points decrease in the Fed funds rate causes a 4.10 to 8.20 percentage points greater increase in cross-border flows by low-capitalized banks than high-capitalized ones. Looking by maturity, we observe a similar result as in Table 2 : Short-term flows exhibit a much stronger response to monetary shocks than do long-term investments. The coefficient on the interaction of the monetary shock and the capital ratio is positive and significant at the 1 percent level: Low-capitalized U.S. banks exhibit a 2.28 percentage points greater response to U.S. monetary policy shocks than high-capitalized ones. Table 4 repeats specifications (1) through (4) from both Tables 2 and 3 , now using the dataset on the sector-specific cross-border lending flows (to the financial, private and the public sectors of host countries). We continue to see strong evidence of an international bank lending channel, using either the deposit to asset ratio in Columns (1) through (4) or the capital ratio in Columns (5) through (8) as our liquidity measure. Looking at the results using the deposit to assets ratio, the coefficients on the 15 interaction terms of bank liquidity and monetary shocks are positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This corresponds to a 2.34 to 3.08 percentage points higher increase in cross-border flows by lowliquidity banks than liquid ones, in response to a 100 basis points decrease in the Fed funds rate.
Using the capital ratio as our measure of bank funding constraints in Columns (5) through (8), the direct effect of a 100 basis points decrease in the Fed funds rate is a 3.66 to 4.43 percentage points increase in bilateral cross-border flows. This impact is significantly higher for low-capitalized banks: A bank at the 25 th percentile of the capital ratio distribution responds by 0.63 to 1.07 percentage points more to a 100 basis points decrease in the Fed funds rate than does a high liquidity bank. All the monetary policy effects in Columns (5) through (8) 
Post-2007 Period
Our analysis thus far has focused on the time period before the onset of the financial crisis and the pursuant recession. In Table 5 In our Table 5 analysis of the post-2007 period, we rely on an extensive set of fixed effects to separate these aggregate shocks from changes in flows brought on by monetary easing. In all our specifications, we include bank controls, bank-host country-maturity or bank-host country-sector fixed effects and time fixed effects. Where possible, we also include a crisis indicator variable for the 2008-2009 periods.
Furthermore, as before, we include four lagged values of our monetary measures and present cumulative marginal effects in Table 5 .
Rate as the measure of US monetary policy stance throughout (we discuss this Rate in a few paragraphs). We find that our results on global monetary transmission remain significant in this pooled specification. 20 Our dataset covers 20 periods in the pre-crisis era, and 21 periods (time-quarters) since the onset of the crisis. (1), (2), (5) and (6), we use the maturitybreakdown cross-border flows data, while in Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) we use the sectoral-breakdown data. For both types of data and monetary policy measures, we examine both the deposit to asset ratio and the capital ratio as measures of bank funding constraints.
Using Krippner (2013)'s shadow short-term rate as our measure of monetary policy in the first four columns of Table 5 , we find significant monetary policy effects using the capital ratio as our constraint measure (Columns 2 and 4). In these specifications, low-capitalized U.S. banks (at the 25 th percentile of capital distribution) raise their cross-border flows 2.8 to 3.4 percentage points more than their highcapitalized counterparts, in response to a 100 basis points decrease in Krippner's short-term shadow rate. 23 These effects are economically relevant as average cross-border flows were 0.66 percent in the post-2007 period (with a standard deviation of 37.71). The results hold up using either the sectoral or 18 maturity-breakdown data and including an exhaustive set of demand and supply-side fixed effects to control for aggregate shocks.
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In Columns (5) through (8), we repeat the specifications of (1) 
Higher vs. Lower Income Host Countries
Our results so far have shown that U.S. monetary policy is associated with changes in cross-border flows, especially for funding constrained banks. While we have controlled for a large number of bank, host country characteristics, and fixed effects, there still may be additional variation in our host country characteristics that explains the U.S. bank response. We take one step towards exploring that variation 19 by including a dummy variable for lower income countries (below the median income per capita in the given time period) and interacting it with U.S. monetary policy measures. The results of that estimation appear in Table 6 . Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 replicate the specifications in Column 4 from Tables 2 and   3 with the addition of a lower income dummy variable and its interaction with the key monetary policy variables. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 replicate Columns 4 and 8 of Table 4 , while Columns 5 through 8 of Table 6 replicate the post-crisis specifications in Columns 1 through 4 of Table 5 in a similar way. Table 6 The data reveals that US banks are significantly less active in lower-income countries: these countries receive flows from a median of 5 US banks, while this number is as high as 11 for higher-income countries. Therefore, this 20
Affiliate flows
In Table 7 , we study the impact of U.S. monetary policy on the local (affiliate) flows of U.S. banks in foreign countries. Previous papers found a strong positive impact of U.S. monetary easing on the foreign affiliate flows of U.S. banks in both the pre-crisis (Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012)) and post-crisis (Morais, Peydró and Ruiz (2015)) periods. Because our local flows data incorporates claims by affiliates who operate as fully chartered subsidiaries in foreign countries, we also expect that provision of liquidity by the host country's monetary authority (as measured by quarterly changes in the host's short-term base rate) would also significantly impact U.S. banks' local flows there. However, we also expect that the extent of host country monetary influence is directly related to the prevalence of the local (host country) currency in U.S. banks' investments there. In Columns (1) through (4), we study the role of U.S. and host country monetary conditions on U.S. banks' local flows via affiliates. In Columns (5) through (8), we then focus on the subset of the local flows of multi-country (non-specialized) U.S. banks in lowly-dollarized countries (i.e., where the share of dollar-denominated claims is below the 40 th percentile across all countries). Throughout Table 7 , we control for changes in host country macro traits, the bias inherent in selective reporting, and an increasingly exhaustive set of demand and supply-side fixed effects.
In our full sample specifications in Columns (1) through (4), we find evidence that host country monetary policy matters, but no support for a role for U.S. monetary policy in determining U.S. banks' foreign affiliate flows. The direct impact of a decrease in host country short-term interest rates on local flows is positive, and significantly more so for low-capitalized U.S. banks. A positive impact of a 100 basis points decrease in the host country interest rate on local flows is 1.86 to 3.88 percentage points higher for lowcapitalized U.S. banks' affiliates than for those of high-capitalized U.S. banks. 26 These effects are exercise in differentiating monetary policy effects along the host country income dimension can also be interpreted as an examination of monetary policy effects across host countries with higher US bank presence vs. lower US bank presence. 26 A 100 basis points change in host country interest rates corresponds to a one-third standard deviation change.
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economically relevant given that the average affiliate flows were equal to 0.68 percent during the sample period (with a standard deviation of 19.43). The significance and magnitude of the difference between the funding-constrained vs. unconstrained banks` monetary effects remains high even after we saturate our model with host country-time and bank fixed effects. The coefficients on both the levels and interactions of U.S. monetary policy changes are insignificant in all our Table 7 specifications.
We expect that the host country monetary policy effects are particularly strong in those foreign countries where the majority of U.S. banks' local claims are denominated in the country's currency (i.e., the currency in which the monetary authority provides liquidity to banks). In line with expectations, our results on the role of host country monetary policy increase in magnitude once we restrict our attention to the subset of multiple-country U.S. banks in lowly-dollarized countries (while the U.S. monetary effects remain insignificant). The direct effect of a 100 basis points decrease in the host country monetary policy rate is as much as a 16.21 percentage points rise in local flows (Column 5). The positive monetary impact is a significant 12.41 to 13.95 percentage points higher for low-capitalized U.S. banks than for high-capitalized ones. The significance of our monetary results disappears once we fully control for demand-side conditions in Columns (7) and (8). This, however, could be due to the fact that our sample size drops substantially (by two-thirds) once we move to our restricted sample.
Notably, we find no evidence on the existence of a bank lending channel of U.S. monetary policy in banks' foreign affiliate flows. At first blush, this result appears to be at odds with the findings of recent papers on the topic. Morais, Peydró and Ruiz (2015) 
The Extensive Margin
In Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix, we examine the role of U.S. monetary policy on the extensive margin: How changes in the U.S. Fed funds rate affected U.S. banks' choice to become globally active (Table A .1) and to establish local presence in a given foreign country (Table A. 2). It is those estimations we used in the previous Tables to control for selection into the set of globally active banks (Table A.1) and affiliate-active host markets (Table A. 2).
In Table A .1, we use a large dataset including the balance sheet and financial data of all U.S. financial institutions over the 2003-2007 period. Our dependent variable of interest is an indicator that takes on a value of 1 if the bank operates beyond U.S. borders in the given period, and 0 otherwise. In a set of logistic specifications described in the Appendix, we examine how this globally active vs. non-active status depends on the stance of U.S. monetary policy, while controlling for an exhaustive set of supplyside conditions (details of the specifications are shown in the Appendix). Regarding the role of monetary policy, a 100 basis points decrease in the U.S. Fed funds rate was associated with a 0.30 to 1.21
percentage points increase in the probability of a U.S. bank maintaining global operations in the precrisis period. Given that the sample probability is 3.74 percent, these are economically meaningful effects. There is no significant difference between low vs. high-capitalized banks in this impact of U.S.
monetary policy. Table A .1 reveals that whether the bank was globally active in the previous period is a very strong predictor of its current globally active status. Bigger banks with lower capitalization are more likely to be active abroad. U.S. banks are also more likely to maintain global operations during periods of economic expansion.
In Table A .2, we focus again on the subset of globally active U.S. banks as in Tables 2 through 6 . In these specifications, we examine any impact that the stance of U.S. monetary policy might have had on U.S.
banks' choice to maintain local operations in a given host market in the pre-crisis period. There is some evidence that changes in the U.S. Fed funds rate affect this decision: Its level effect is significant in two of the four specifications (including our most saturated model in Column 4). The interaction of monetary policy changes with bank capitalization is significant in our two most saturated specifications (Columns 3 and 4). Therefore, there is some evidence that decreases in the U.S. Fed funds rate contribute to U.S.
banks' likelihood of adding a local presence in a foreign country that it already maintains a cross-border relationship with. These effects remain even after controlling for host country macro controls and host country and bank fixed effects. However, the strongest predictors of this decision appear to be bank size and whether the bank already maintained local presence in the country in the previous period. Both these variables have positive and strongly significant effects on local presence probability.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the functioning of the bank lending channel through foreign flows moves the study of these spillover effects forward. To Public Sector (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of total cross-border claims on the host country`s public sector in quarter t pre-crisis Predicted Probability that US Bank Lends Across Borders predicted probability that the US bank lends across borders (i.e., reports on the FFIEC 009 form), derived from the logistic regression in Appendix Predicted Probability that US Bank Maintains Affiliate in Host Country predicted probability that the US bank maintains an affiliate in the host country (i.e., reports non-zero affiliate claims), derived from the logistic regression in Appendix Note. --The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit granted with a maturity less than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one year). Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Capital-Asset Ratio, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a logistic regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [4] ). The Multiple Countries sample includes banks active in five countries or more. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by maturity are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed effects is impossible to include. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities for banks with different liquidity ratios during the 2003:Q1-2007:Q4 period Note. --The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit granted with a maturity less than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one year). Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a logistic regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [4] ). The Multiple Countries sample includes banks active in five countries or more. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by maturity are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed effects is impossible to include. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Table 1 Model [4] ). Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the sectoral level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
following a decrease in the US federal funds rate by 100 bps by lower (25%) versus higher (75%) capitalized banks:
Percentage point change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and sectors Table 1 Model [4] ). Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the sectoral or maturity level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Note. --The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit granted with a maturity less than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one year) Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a logistic regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [4] ). The Lower Income dummy variable included in its level and interactions indicates countries below the median GDP per capita across host countries in the given time period. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by maturity and sector are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed effects is impossible to include. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Table 2 Model 4). The Multiple Countries sample includes banks active in five countries or more. The Lowly-Dollarized Countries sample includes host countries for which the share of non-local currency to total US bank lending is below the 40 percentile across all countries that US banks lend to. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the sectoral level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Table 7 following a decrease in the US federal funds rate by 100 bps by lower (25%) versus higher (75%) capitalized banks:
